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CASE NOTES
advantage."51
 The union's interest in keeping service markets competitive,
says Goldberg, is based on their desire for job security. Certainly, then, the
union's benefit from imposing an operating-hours restriction on Jewel Tea, if
Jewel Tea would not use union men after six, is indirect. Goldberg's expansive
interpretation of the union's "direct interest" could just as easily lead to the
conclusion that a union has the right to impose a similar restriction on a store
that does not even sell meat simply because it might competitively affect their
employers. Such a viewpoint is a dangerous enlargement of labor strength."
Writing for the three dissenters, Mr. Justice Douglas focuses on estab-
lishing a conspiracy against Jewel Tea." Then he passes to a brief disagree-
ment with Goldberg's argument, apparently implying that he would agree with
Mr. Justice White's view that the union can only impose demands on em-
ployers for whom they work." Yet his treatment of this subject is so short
and vague as to leave the Court without any real authoritative position on
this important issue.
The Pennington and Jewel Tea cases represent new limitations on the
union's exemption from Sherman Act prosecution. The Pennington doctrine is
far more expansive and significant since it limits "what a union or an em-
ployer may offer or extract in the name of wages."" Jewel Tea merely restates
the relationship which must exist between a labor union and an employer
group before the former can impose demands on the latter. Assuming the dis-
senters would agree with Mr. Justice White in a subsequent case, it might be
said that Jewel Tea defines the circumstances in which negotiators may enjoy
the privilege of unrestricted collective bargaining, and Pennington establishes
what the Court really means by "unrestricted." This redefinition of terms
could very likely signify that labor unions have grown to a stage when their
lawful activities might once again be judicially evaluated as "economically
and socially objectionable.""
LAWRENCE A. KATz
Trade Regulation—Imitation Foods—Effect of Labeling.—Coffee-Rich,
Inc. v. Commissioner of Pub. Healtb. 1—Coffee-Rich, a non-dairy product
conspicuously labeled as such, is used primarily to enrich and sweeten coffee.
Sold at retail from frozen food chests, it is a wholesome, vegetable product.
Under Chapter 94, Section 187 of the Massachusetts General Laws,2 a
food product is misbranded if it is "in imitation or semblance of any other
food," unless it is conspicuously labeled an imitation. The statute is even
more strict with regard to foods for which statutory standards have been
51 Id. at 1624.
52
 See note 49 supra.
53 See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra.
54 See the last paragraph of Mr. justice Douglas' dissent, supra note 2, at 1607.
55 Supra note 1, at 1591.
56 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, supra note 12, at 486.
1 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 155, 204 N,E.2d 281.
2 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94, § 187 (1932), as amended, St. 1948, ch. 598, § 2.
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set, permitting no imitation of these,° regardless of labeling, with certain
exceptions not applicable here.°
The Director of the Division of Food and Drugs of the Department
of Public Health notified Coffee-Rich of his intention to proceed against it
under the provisions of chapter 94.° Coffee-Rich withdrew voluntarily from
the institutional market° but continued to sell through retail stores, and
brought this action to enjoin the Director from enforcing the statute. The
case was reserved and reported to the Supreme Judicial Court. HELD: The
Director is enjoined from enforcing the statute against the sale of Coffee-
Rich in retail stores.
The court reasoned that while Coffee-Rich is in imitation of cream
under the statute, the purpose of the statute is to prevent consumer confu-
sion.? Since Coffee-Rich is honestly and distinctively labeled and sold in
a frozen state, there is no significant danger of consumer confusion at the
retail level and, therefore, the application of section 187 to Coffee-Rich
cannot be rationally justified. Furthermore, since it is admittedly whole-
some and nutritious, the prohibition of its sale cannot be upheld as an
effort to protect public health or safety under the state's police power. In
the absence of the danger which the statute is intended to prevent, its
application to petitioner was held to violate the Massachusetts Constitution.°
The court apparently felt itself bound by its earlier decision in Aera-
tion Processes, Inc. v. Commissioner of Pub. Health,° where it had ruled
that the presence of a labeling provision in the statute precluded it from
considering the veracity or effect of food product labeling in determining
whether a product is an imitation. 10 Thus the court felt obliged to exclude
any consideration of the labeling of Coffee-Rich in determining that it was
in imitation of cream.
In Aeration, the court had established a three-element criterion of
imitation. The product in 'question, Instantblend, was found to be
an imitation within § 187 because (1) it resembles cream but does
not conform to the statutory standards therefor, (2) apart from
information supplied by labeling, there is a likelihood that an
3 In Brief for Petitioner, pp. 57-64, it is argued that section 187 does not prohibit
the imitation of standardized food products. The fact that section 187 "shall not be
construed to permit the imitation of any food for which a standard has been estab-
lished by law . ." is insufficient, in petitioner's opinion, to constitute a prohibition of
such imitation in the 'absence of more explicit prohibitory language. The court apparently
rejected this construction.
4
 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94, § 49 (1932) (oleomargarine); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94,
§ 50 (1932) (imitation cheese). No exception from section 187 is made for cream.
5 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94, § 12 (1932) establishes the statutory standards for cream.
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 94, § 189A (1958) and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94, § 191 (1932)
provide for enforcement procedures and penalties.
6
 This term embraces those sales where it is unlikely that the ultimate consumer
sees the original labels.
7 Supra note 1, at 163, 204 N.E.2d at 287, citing Aeration Processes, Inc. v. Com-
missioner of Pub. Health, 346 Mass. 546, 550, 194 N.E.2d 838, 841 (1963).
8 Mass. Const., Declaration of Rights, arts. 1, 10, 12; pt. II, ch. 1, § 1, art. 4.
D Aeration Processes, Inc. v. Commissioner of Pub. Health, supra note 7.
10 Id. at 551, 194 N.E.2d at 842.
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average consumer, aware of Instantblend's intended use, will con-
fuse it with cream, and (3) there is no showing that Instantblend
and cream are so differentiated in the mind of the average consumer
interested in the distinction that, by making reasonable effort, he
would discover with which product he is confronted. 11
The court unequivocally asserted that "Coffee-Rich unmistakenly falls
within the proscription of section 187, as did Instantblend in the Aeration
case, as 'in imitation or semblance' of cream.'"
Coffee-Rich offered the court alternative definitions of "imitation"" in
the hope that it could avoid application to it of section 187. Even if the
court had accepted one of these definitions, however, it still would have been
forced to find that Coffee-Rich fell within the meaning of the statute
because of the presence of the language, "or semblance," in the statute. In
making its finding of imitation, the court emphasized the following factors:
(1) Coffee-Rich is not cream; (2) it is intended to be used as a substitute for
cream; (3) it looks like cream; and (4) it tastes like cream when mixed with
coffee. 14
The court rejected the concept of "semblance" offered in Carey v.
Instantwhip Schenectady, Inc. 15 In that case, the Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court concluded that while Instantwhip Topping resem-
bled whipped cream in general appearance, the resemblance was due to the
"inherent characteristics of the ingredients of the topping,'" and not
to any attempt by its manufacturers to simulate whipped cream. Without
an attempt to mislead, which is "implicit in the phrase 'in the semblance
of'," 17 the New York court refused to find that Instantwhip Topping was in
imitation or semblance of whipped cream. Superficially, this case seems to
be in direct conflict with the instant case. However, the basic difference lies
not in the definitions given to "semblance," but rather in the different pur-
poses of the two statutes involved. The Massachusetts statute is intended
to prevent consumer confusion, whereas the New York statute is designed
to prevent fraud or deception of the consumer by the producer or vendor."
In light of this distinction, the New York courts must give "semblance" a
more restricted meaning than does the Massachusetts court.
Having thus found that Coffee-Rich violated the statute, the court
examined its constitutionality as applied to Coffee-Rich. In Aeration, it
had not considered the constitutionality of section 187 because the record
11 Id. at 553-54, 194 N.E.2d at 843.
12 Supra note 1, at 159, 204 N.E.2d at 285.
13 E.g., Coffee-Rich, Inc. v. Kansas State Bd. of Health, 192 Kan. 431, 437, 388
P.2d 582, 587 (1964) (inferiority or watering down of the original is required); Dairy
Queen, Inc, v. McDowell, 260 Wis, 471, 476-78, 51 N.W.2d 34, 37-38 (1952) (resemblance
alone is insufficient to constitute imitation in view of the manner of sale, advertising and
labeling). For a summary of definitions offered, see Brief for Petitioner, pp. 50-51,
14 Supra note 1, at 159, 204 N.E.2d at 285.
15 14 App. Div. 2d 467, 217 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1961).
16 Id. at 468, 217 N.Y.S.2d at 254.
17 Id. at 468, 217 N.Y.S.2d at 255.
18 Id. at 468, 217 N.Y.S.2d at 254. See also People v. Guiton, 210 N.Y. 1, 103
N.E. 773 (1913); People v. Arensberg, 105 N.Y. 123, 11 N.E. 277 (1887).
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[did] not raise the issue whether such prohibition may be imposed
under the State Constitution notwithstanding a showing that sub-
stantial confusion could not result because the product was dis-
tinctively labeled."
There, sales were made to the institutional market and the ultimate consumer
was not likely to see the product's label. Now, in Cof ee-Rich, the court was
confronted with precisely this issue. To sustain the validity of the statute
under the Massachusetts constitution, it had to be established that it
"bears a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or
some other phase of the general welfare." 20 The validity of the statute's
application depended upon whether it was, under the circumstances, a
reasonable method of achieving the intended result—the avoidance of con-
sumer confusion. To resolve this issue, the court finally considered packaging
and labeling, which it had ignored in determining imitation. Since these
factors would prevent the average user, the retail purchaser, from buying
Coffee-Rich under the mistaken impression that it was cream, there was
no likelihood of confusion to justify the prohibition of its retail sale. For
this reason, the court found the statute to be unconstitutional as applied
to Coffee-Rich.
The approach taken by the courts of California and Wisconsin has
yielded a preferable result. The California Court of Appeals in Midget
Prods., Inc. v. Jacobsen21
 considered conspicuous and truthful labeling of
an allegedly imitation food product to be an element which would prevent
consumer confusion. Where the possibility of such confusion was absent, the
court refused to find imitation. Similarly, the Circuit Court of Wisconsin, in
Coffee-Rich, Inc. v. McDozve11, 22
 said that
mere resemblance in color, taste and texture does not make a product
an imitation within the meaning of the statute when it is clearly
labeled and identifiable by its frozen state as being a different
product.23
The use of this approach in the instant case would have resulted in the
court's placing Coffee-Rich within the statute solely on a finding of semblance.
The court would then be limited to determining the constitutionality of
totally prohibiting a wholesome food product because of mere resemblance to
another food. This could possibly have led to the eventual striking of
"semblance" from the statute and the formulation of a more workable con-
cept of imitation.
The basic flaw in Aeration was the formulation of the unnecessarily broad
rule that section 187 precludes any consideration of truthful and distinctive
labeling in determining the issue of imitation. Instantblend, honestly labeled,
19
 Aeration Processes, Inc. v. Commissioner of Pub. Health, supra note 7, at 554,
194 N.E.2d at 843.
20
 Supra note 1, at 162, 204 N.E.2d at 287, citing Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v.
Director of the Div. on the Necessaries of Life, 307 Mass. 408, 418, 30 N.E.2d 269, 275
(1940).
21 140 Cal. App. 2d 517, 295 P.2d 542 (1956).
22
 CCH FOC L. Rep. ¶ 40,047 (1963).
23 Id. at 40,137.
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was being sold in bulk to institutions and was being dispensed with coffee to
their customers. It is highly unlikely that these consumers ever saw the
Instantblend label. The honest labeling may have prevented the middlemen
from being confused, but it had no effect on the ultimate consumer who
relied solely on Instantblend's appearance. Therefore, the court should
have excluded the consideration of Instantblend's labeling as a factor ir-
relevant to confusion of the ultimate consumer because. of the circumstances,
not on the basis of an immutable construction of the statute.
The court's construction of section 187 is based on an erroneous inter-
pretation in Aeration of United States v. Chil-Zert.24 Despite its honest and
conspicuous labeling, Chil-Zert was found to be an imitation ice-cream, sub-'
ject to the labeling provisions of the statute. The Massachusetts court con-
strued this to mean that whenever a statute contains a provision for the label-
ing of imitation foods, the veracity or effect of the food's labeling cannot be
considered in making the initial determination whether imitation exists.
Since the federal court in Chil-Zert used a test of the composite effect of
many factors in determining that Chil-Zert was an imitation ice-cream
and since nowhere in its decision did it say that the honesty, distinctiveness
and conspicuousness of labeling could not constitute elements contributing
to this composite effect, Chil-Zert should more properly be used as authority
for the proposition that, once imitation has been established as a fact,
honest labeling will not exempt the imitation product from the labeling
provisions of the statute.
In Coffee-Rich, the court could have distinguished the cases and qualified
or even abandoned the broad rule without upsetting the result in Aeration.
But the court instead carried the rule intact over to the facts of Co f ee-Rich.
Such an approach to labeling in this case has resulted in a construction
of section 187 probably not intended nor even contemplated by the legisla-
ture. Now, cream, a product heretofore subject to the strictest scrutiny, may
be imitated so long as consumer confusion is avoided. Imitation fruit flavor-
ings, on the other hand, are subject to what appears to be a stricter standard
in that they must display the word "imitation" on their labels. 2°
The court's decision may, however, have the fortuitous result of forcing
the legislature to adopt a clearer and more comprehensive statute regulating
imitation food products. 27
 Such legislative standards become increasingly
necessary as modern technology develops more synthetic food products.28
JOHN F. BURKE
24 114 F. Supp. 430 (N.D.N.Y. 1953).
25 Id. at 432:
It is plain that no ail-inclusive test of imitation can be prescribed. .
	
. Chil-
Zert is identical with ice cream in its method of manufacture, packaging and
sale. It is similar in taste, appearance, color, texture, body and melting qualities.
It has identical uses; its composition differs only from ice cream in the sub-
stitution of a cheaper ingredient; namely, vegetable oil in place of milk products.
2° See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94, § 187 (1932), as amended, St. 1948, ch. 598, § 2.
27 This result may not be entirely fortuitous. A hint of the court's possible dissatis-
faction with the present statute is contained in Aeration Processes, Inc, v. Commissioner
of Pub. Health, supra note 7, at 554 n.8, 194 N.E.2d at 843 n.8.
28 Mr. Justice Spiegel, as Single Justice, determined the details of the injunction
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